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Trading data from the gambling market for the 2002 World Cup provide a unique window through
which to test theories of market efficiency. This market provides many of the benefits of a laboratory
experiment, but with much higher stakes, experienced participants, and a naturally-occurring
environment. The primary drawback of the data is the relatively small number of trades. The evidence
concerning market efficiency is mixed. Although markets respond strongly to goals being scored,
there is some evidence that prices continue to trend higher for 10–15 minutes after a goal. We also
observe systematically negative returns for bets on the pre-game favorite, consistent with the biases
seen in wagering on other sports. We document the endogenous emergence of market makers. These
market makers are involved in a large share of trades. Increasing from two active market makers to
five or more market makers does not appear to improve the functioning of the market. On average, the
market makers earn slightly negative returns, implying that other traders are able to identify situations
in which market makers are setting inefficient prices.
Data limitations pose an important obstacle to testing theories of finance in
real-world financial markets. Researchers typically cannot directly observe
the arrival of new information to the market. The identities, characteristics,
and information sets of particular traders are likewise usually unknown to the
econometrician. In the face of these intrinsic data weaknesses, testing some of
the most basic predictions, e.g., that efficient markets quickly and completely
incorporate new information into prices, become difficult to test.1
One approach to testing whether new information is incorporated quickly
and fully into markets is to analyze special cases in which new information
becomes available to market participants at an identifiable point in time, e.g.
announcements about the money supply (Pearce and Roley 1985, Chen et al.
1986), earnings (Beaver 1968), layoffs (Worrell et al. 1991), etc. One limitation
of such tests is that some actors may have access to the information (or some
portion of it) in these announcements ahead of time, either through research or
insider information. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), for instance, document large
price run-ups for tender offer targets in advance of the offers being made.
A second approach researchers have used to circumvent the complexities
of real-world financial markets has been to create artificial markets in
controlled laboratory settings. Chamberlain (1948) and Smith (1962),
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represent early applications of this approach, finding that artificial markets did
not reach the equilibrium prices predicted by theory, or did so only under
restrictive conditions. More recently, Plott and Sunder (1988) and List (2004)
find evidence more consistent with theory. One drawback of these
experimental studies is the artificiality of the setting, as argued in Levitt and
List (2007a, 2007b). Subjects newly exposed to an experimental market may
only learn slowly how to optimally trade, particularly if these subjects have
limited experience trading in other financial markets or the rules of thumb used
in naturally occurring markets are not rewarded in the lab. In addition, the
amount of money at risk in experiments is small. Consequently, the cost
associated with sub-optimal trading behavior is likewise small.
In this paper, we follow a third approach that combines some of the most
desirable features of the research strategies described above. Namely, we
analyze trading in anon-traditional, but real-world,market for outcomesof 2002
World Cup soccer matches.2 The data were provided by the internet trading site
www.intrade.com. Unlike typical betting markets in which all bets must be
placed prior to the start of an event and a bookmaker takes one side of the bet, the
market we analyze is a true financial market with real-time trading during the
course of a match and contracts with traders on both sides of each transaction.
This market provides many of the benefits of an experimental setting. First,
the primary innovation in information in this market is the scoring of a goal.
Goals are relatively rare (2.32 per game on average, or about one goal for every
40 minutes of play) and have a large impact on the asset’s final value. Because
these games are televised, all traders have virtually simultaneous access to new
information in the formof goals, and it is also observable to the econometrician.
Second, we know the identities of all traders in our data and can match IDs
across trades and assets. Like standard financial markets, these traders have
self-selected and presumably are knowledgeable soccer fans with experience
betting on game outcomes. Third, we have not just completed transactions, but
also the full set of bid and ask offers, even if these offers are cancelled or expire
prior to execution. Fourth, the asset we examine has a pre-determined terminal
date (i.e. the end of the game), unlike equities and currencies. This eliminates
the need to take into account expectations about future events such as the flow
of future dividends when pricing the security. Finally, the amount of money at
stake, while not large in any absolute sense (a total of $1.5 million worth of
contracts were traded), is far greater than in experimental settings.
Using these data, we are able to test a wide array of predictions about how
markets function. In favor of efficient markets, we find that the prices in soccer
betting markets move sharply when a goal is scored, but that prices 10–15
minutes after the goal is scored are statistically significantly higher than
immediately after the goal, providing some evidence of market inefficiency.
The markets do appear to be efficient in the sense that there are few pure
arbitrage opportunities available by trading combinations of securities related
to a particular match. On the other hand, at least in our small sample, there are
systematic biases in valuations with traders overestimating the likelihood that
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the pre-game favorite will win the match. While we are guarded in our
interpretationof this result given the limited number of games in the sample, it is
consistent with past evidence of a bias towards favorites in sports betting
markets (e.g.,Golec andTamarkinGray andGray 1997,Levitt 2004,Woodland
and Woodland 1994).
We also document the endogenous emergence of traders acting as market
makers (i.e. simultaneously offering to buy and sell a given contract at some
bid-ask spread). Between two and eight market makers operate in the various
games in our sample. Market makers represent at least one side of 65 percent
of all trades made while the games are taking place. We find little difference in
the functioning of the market (e.g. the size of the bid-ask spread) as the
number of market makers increases. Market makers overall make losses,
despite the fact that their offers to buy are typically 5 percentage points below
their offers to sell at any point in time. This implies that the traders taking the
other side of trades with market makers have some success in identifying
those instances where market makers are mispricing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes
the data and presents summary statistics. Section III tests various predictions
of the efficient market hypothesis and theories of trading volume. Section IV
analyzes market maker behavior. Section V concludes.
DATA DESCRIPTION
The data we use are from www.intrade.com, an internet website offering
trading in thousands of sports, financial, and political contracts annually.3
Intrade.com is not a bookmaker and does not take positions in the securities.
Rather, they create securities based on publicly observable outcomes (e.g. which
team will win a game, how many inches of snow will fall in New York in
December, whowill win theU.S. presidential election). Traders with accounts at
the web site then post bid and ask offers, with intrade.com serving as the
clearinghouse for matching buyers to sellers. In return for their services,
intrade.com charged a transaction cost of eight cents per trader for each $10
contract traded.4
The particular contracts we focus on are futures contracts on the outcomes
of soccer matches played as part of the 2002World Cup. For each match, there
are three contracts offered: one that pays off if a particular team wins, another
that pays off if the other team wins, and a third that pays off if it is a draw.5
The outcomes of the contracts are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so
exactly one contract pays off on any game.
All trades aremade online using a pre-established trading account. For each
contract, market participants are able to observe in real-time a market order
book that lists the full set of prices and quantities of current bids and asks for
each security. The trader also observes his own positions and account balances.
For each contract offered our data set includes the full order book second
by second, along with the precise time, price, volume traded, and identities
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of each trader. Trading occurs somewhat infrequently in these markets – on
average there are 63 trades over the life of a contract, 64 percent of which
occur during the roughly two hours over which the game is being played (there
are two 45 minute halves, a 15 minute intermission, a few minutes of referee
determined extra time). Consequently, in much of our analysis, we aggregate
trading data from continuous time up to a unit of analysis of one minute
intervals. When more than one transaction occurs in a given minute on a
particular security, we take quantity-weighted averages of the prices to
construct our price. If no trade occurs in a particular minute, then that minute
is excluded from any analysis involving prices.
We match the price data with published information on the time at which
each goal is scored over the course of the game. Our trading data are recorded in
Greenwich Mean Time, whereas the timing of goals is based on the minutes of
play that have elapsed in the game. This introduces some possible noise into the
matchingbetweenprices and the timingofgoals.Tominimize errors,wehad two
researchassistants independently undertake the taskofperforming thematching.
Inalmost everygame, the researchassistants produced identicalmappings. In the
cases where there was disagreement, the discrepancies were only 1-2 minutes,
and the authors used their best judgment to arbitrate the appropriate choice.
Table 1 presents basic information on each of the 50 games that comprise
the sample. We show the teams playing, date, final score, and whether the
outcome of the game was an upset based on the pre-game prices. We also
report the dollar value of contracts traded, the number of trades, the number of
market makers active, the number of different individuals making at least one
trade on the game, and the fraction of the dollar volume which is traded while
the game is in the running (as opposed to in advance of the game). The games
took place over the course of roughly a month in June 2002. The total dollar
value of trades ranged from a low of $2,030 to over $70,000. The typical game
has between one hundred and two hundred trades. There are at least two
market makers in each game, with as many as eight sometimes operating.
The median number of individuals trading in a particular game is 75.
TESTING THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
Theefficientmarkethypothesismakes anumberofpredictions for thesedata:
(1) newly arriving information should be quickly and completely incorporated
into market prices, (2) no pure arbitrage opportunities across securities should
exist, and (3) expected profits should be equalized across characteristics
of positions that are readily observable to market participants, such as whether
a team is a favorite or an underdog. We explore these three predictions in turn.
The efficiency with which new information is incorporated into market prices
The hallmark of efficient markets is the ability to quickly and completely
incorporate new information into asset prices. Once a soccer match is
underway, the primary innovation in information is the scoring of a goal.6
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To test the response of these markets to a goal being scored, we analyze the
pattern of prices in the 30 minute window bracketing each score (15 minutes
before and 15 minutes after the goal) by estimating regressions of the form:
Pricem;c;w;t 2 Pr icem;c;w;pre ¼
X15
g¼215
bgGoalm;c;w;tþg þ 1m;c;w;tð1Þ
where m identifies the match, c refers to the particular contract on the match
(i.e. pre-game favorite to win, pre-game underdog to win), w corresponds to
the particular window of 30 minutes bracketing a score, and t represents the
minute of the match.7 In order to anchor the prices for each contract and
window around a common value, we normalize all prices by subtracting the
mean price at which the contract traded five to fifteen minutes prior to the goal
being scored.8 The thirty b coefficients represent the minute-by-minute price
deviations in the 15 minute time period leading up to and following a goal
being scored.9 Goal is an indicator variable corresponding to a particular
minute which is equal to one when a goal is scored in the team’s favor,
negative one when the opposing team scores, and zero otherwise. We estimate
Default (1) using weighted least squares, with the weights determined by the
volume of contracts traded in that minute of the match. Parts of the game that
are not within 15 minutes of a goal are excluded from the regression. If
multiple goals are scored within a 30 minute period, the same observation will
be included more than once since it falls into multiple goal windows. We
cluster by game and contract type to take into account the resulting correlation
across observations. If a goal is scored in the last 15 minutes of the game, the
sample window will be truncated by the end of the game. Depending on the
regression, we will sometimes limit the sample to a subset of goals, e.g. goals
scored by teams with a one-goal lead immediately before the goal occurs.
The results of estimating Default (1) for the full sample of goals are shown
in Figure 1. We show the b estimates along with 95 percent confidence
intervals. Prices are flat on average in advance of a goal and rise sharply just
after the goal is scored.10 The magnitude of the price change accompanying a
goal is approximately 20–30 on a scale that runs from 0 to 100, meaning that
scoring a goal on average changes the bettors’ estimates of the likelihood that
this team will ultimately win by 20–30 percentage points and lowers the
likelihood the opposing teamwill win by that amount.11 The estimates are very
precise before the goal is scored (as evidenced by the relatively narrow
95 percent confidence interval) and somewhat less precise after a goal is scored
because of the heterogeneous impact on price of goals in different situations.
There is some visual evidence that the initial price changes are not as large
as those 10–15 minutes after the goal is scored, implying that the new
information is not fully and immediately incorporated. Indeed, we can reject
the null hypothesis that the prices in the first few minutes after a goal is scored
are equal to the later prices.12 A strategy of buying contracts in the period 1–3
minutes after a goal is scored, and then liquidating these positions 13–15
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minutes after that same goal, would have yielded a positive return on
investment of roughly 4 percent before transaction costs and 2.4 percent after
transaction costs.
The frequency with which arbitrage opportunities arise across related
securities
In efficient markets, one does not expect arbitrage opportunities to be
large or persistent. In games in which a draw is possible, there are two
combinations of trades that can potentially yield arbitrage profits: (1) going
long all three contracts (the pre-game favorite to win, the pre-game underdog
to win, and the draw), or (2) shorting all three contracts. In the first case, one
gets paid off on exactly one contract with certainty. In the second instance, the
arbitrager is guaranteed to have to pay off exactly one of the three contracts.
If the total of the ask prices on the three contracts (plus transaction costs) is
less than 100 at any point in time, an arbitrage opportunity is available.
And similarly, if the three bid prices (minus transaction costs) are more than
100, then the second arbitrage opportunity is present.
Table 2 reports the frequency, persistence, and magnitude with which
such arbitrage opportunities arise. Column 1 shows that there were a total of
3 instances we identify in which an arbitrage opportunity was present.
The arbitrage chances lasted, on average, for less than 15 seconds, as
demonstrated in Column 2. Thus, during the playing of these 50 games, there
was a total of less than 20 minutes out of roughly 100 hours of play in which
an arbitrage opportunity was available, or about one-third of one percent of
the time. Given that trading in these markets is relatively sparse (not a single
trade occurs in about two-thirds of the game minutes we observe), it is
interesting that these arbitrage opportunities so quickly correct themselves.
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FIGURE 1. Price Response to a Goal Scored.
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The rapidity of the market adjustment is even more remarkable in light of the
fact that the total profit that an arbitrageur would have made by exploiting all
of these opportunities totals to less than $800.
Equal returns across readily observable security characteristics
In an efficient market, one would not expect readily observable
characteristics of securities to be systematically associated with excess
returns.13 Table 3 summarizes the dollar value invested, realized profits (after
transaction costs), and return on investment for the various types of contracts.
In each case, we report results for both investors who are long the contract and
those that are short the contract. The first row includes all contract types.
The total dollar value of investment at risk across all trades (both long and
short) was $1.447 million. Well more than half of the money at risk was for
those who were short the position ($875,307); because there are three
contracts on each game and only one contract will pay out at the end of the
game, short sellers typically have to put up more money than those going long.
Investments that were long the securities lost a total of almost $55,000.
Short sellers made over $30,000. The difference between these totals
($23,147) reflects the transaction cost associated with Intrade’s commission of
1.6 percent per contract (0.4 percent of the face value of each $10 contract for
each trader both in opening and closing a position). The profits associated with
taking the short position are difficult to explain. There are no institutional
obstacles associated with short selling in this context – any trader can readily
take a short position. Being short does generally require a greater investment
(because only one of three contracts pays off), but it is hard to believe this can
account for the striking pattern in the data.
The next three rows divide the sample into the three different contract
types: the pre-game favorite to win, the underdog to win, and a draw to occur.
Long positions on the favorite to win yield negative returns of almost $50,000,
with corresponding profits of almost $38,000 for those short the pre-game
favorite to win (the gap between these two is again the commission charged on
transactions).
TABLE 2
Summary of Arbitrage Opportunities
Position:
Unique arbitrage
opportunities
Average length
of time opportunity
exists (in seconds)
Total value
of arbitrage opportunities ($)
Long on all three 17 12.53 $100.38
Short on all three 56 14.55 $675.98
Arbitrage opportunities take into account transaction costs associated with buying or selling a contract.
The unit of observation is game x second. The unique number of arbitrage opportunities counts each
aribtrage opportunity only once (an opportunity that lasts 10 seconds will only be counted once).
The average length of time the arbitrage opportunity exists is conditional on this seconds having an
arbitrage opportunity. The total value of the arbitrage opportunities displays the total amount of money that
could have been made by fully exploiting the arbitrage opportunities.
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The availability of positive returns shorting favorites runs contrary to
efficientmarket predictions. One possible explanation for the findings is that they
are an aberration resulting from a small sample of games. If an unusually large
number of upsets and an unexpectedly small number of draws occurred in the
2002 World Cup, such a result would arise in sample. Table 3, which displays
game outcomes for the three most recent World Cups, however, calls into
question this explanation for the findings. Favored teams won a greater share of
games in the 2002 World Cup (our sample) than in either the 1994 or 1998
tournaments.14,15
For the other two contract types, returns are much closer to being
equalized across short and long. Being short the underdog yields a small
profit, as does being long the draw.
THE ROLE OF MARKET MAKERS
Themarkets we are analyzing are relatively thinly traded, making liquidity
an issue. One interesting feature of these markets is the endogenous emergence
of market makers who provide liquidity by offering to either buy or sell a
substantial volume (at least $500worth) of a given contract at a particular point
in time. These market makers are not affiliated with Intrade and do not get
special treatment vis-a`-vis other traders. They are simply individual traders
who elect to provide market liquidity in pursuit of profits. Market makers are
on at least one side of the trade in 65 percent of the total contracts traded and
they represent approximately 50 percent of the money invested.
Table 5 provides information about the distribution of numbers of market
makers, trading activity, and bid-ask spreads by contract. For every contract
we observe, there are at least two traders who take a market maker role.
On over 20 percent of the contracts there are five or more market makers in
action (eight is the maximum). The second row of the table reports the average
volume traded on each contract, by number of market makers. Trade volumes
are an increasing function of the number of market makers. This correlation
may reflect the fact that additional market makers increase liquidity in the
markets. Alternatively, it may simply be that the same factors that generate
TABLE 4
Wins, Ties, and Losses for Match Favorites in Previous World Cups
Year Won Tied Lost
1994 (USA) 49.02 (N ¼ 25) 23.53 (N ¼ 12) 27.45 (N ¼ 14)
1998 (France) 54.69 (N ¼ 35) 25.00 (N ¼ 16) 20.31 (N ¼ 13)
2002 (Korea & Japan) 60.94 (N ¼ 39) 21.88 (N ¼ 14) 17.19 (N ¼ 11)
This table reports the number and percentage of team s that lost, tied, or won their games conditional on
being the favorite as ranked by FIFA. A team was ranked as the favorite if its FIFA ranking was higher than
that of its opponent prior to the beginning of each World Cup. For this table only, we use the FIFA ranking
to determine favorites in 2002 for consistency with earlier World Cups. The rankings vary over time. Note
that the 1994 World Cup only had 51 games while the 1998 and the 2002 World Cups both had 64 games.
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trading interest also encourage more market makers to enter. Analysis of the
median and mean bid-ask spreads on the contracts suggest that the latter
explanation is likely more important. The median bid-ask spread varies
between three and four and it is not clearly declining with the addition of more
market makers.16 The mean bid-ask spread is highest when there are four
market makers, and lowest when there are five or more market makers. In sum,
it appears that the contracts with two market makers provide about as
smoothly as those with more market makers.
Table 6 shows returns to traders by the total number of trades they make,
with market makers broken out separately. More active traders do better than
those who make fewer trades, although this may be due in part to selection: if a
trader has done poorly thus far betting on the World Cup, he may be less likely
to continue trading. The interesting exception to the pattern of frequent traders
doing better is for market makers. Although market makers are extremely
active traders, their net profits are negative, even before transaction costs.
If the bid-ask spread set by market makers is centered on the true
probabilities and the spread offered by the market makers is 4 percent, then the
TABLE 5
Value of Trades and Bid-Ask Spread Information by Number of Market-Makers
Number of Market Makers active in the Contract
2 3 4 5 þ
Number of Contracts 46 37 32 35
Average $ Trade Volume 5643 9180 11149 14019
Median Bid-Ask Spread 4 3 4 3
Mean Bid-Ask Spread 5.71 5.11 6.15 4.34
Data are by minute and contract. The Bid-Ask spread is the difference between the highest bid (buy) offer
and the lowest ask (sell) offer at each minute of the game (the actual measurements are taken at exactly
1 minute into the game, exactly 2 minutes into the game, etc.). T here were no contracts with fewer than
2 market makers or m ore than 8 market makers. The threshold for being considered a market maker is
simultaneously offering to buy and sell at least 50 units of a single contract.
TABLE 6
Distribution of Profits by Trader Activity and Number of Teams Bet On
By Number of Trades: Total Investment ($) Total Return ($) ROI (%)
Small (0–49) 177532 216877 29.51
Medium (50–99) 186864 2539 20.29
Large (. 99) 378162 11892 3.14
Market Makers 704122 217622 22.50
The unit of observation is a trader. Market makers are not included in the Number of Trades categories
except for the Market Makers category. A person is considered to be a market maker if she has concurrent
offers to buy and sell more than 50 units of a given contract. Market maker status can vary across contracts
for the same person (a person can be a market maker on one contract and not a market maker on a separate
contract). Total Investment and Total Return are dollar figures. Total Return takes into account the fee that
In Trade takes on each transaction or expired contract offer. The fees relevant for our data amount to 8 cents
per person per contract (In Trade has since lowered its fees). ROI is the return on investment, defined as the
total return divided by the total investment.
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expected market maker profit would be 2 percent per trade, minus a 0.8 percent
transaction fee, for a net profit rate of 1.2 percent per trade. The total dollar
value of trades by market makers of about $700,000 would imply an expected
profit of $8,400. In practice, however, market makers lose $17,622 in the
sample, for a return on investment of22.5 percent. This suggests that the bids
and asks posted by the market makers are not centered around the true
probabilities, and that on average the bettors on the other side of the trade have
better estimates of the true probabilities than the market makers.17 Market
makers do particularly badly just before and after a goal is scored – about
30% of their total losses arise in the minute before and minute of a goal. This
suggests that in some cases other gamblers are able to take advantage of the
arriveal of new information before the market makers are able to cancel their
posted bid-ask spreads.
CONCLUSION
Trading in securities tied to the outcome of World Cup matches provide a
unique window onto the working of real-world markets. These contracts have
many of the virtues of laboratory experiments on markets: the security traded
is simple, it is easy to identify information innovations and all market
participants observe these information shocks simultaneously. TheWorld Cup
contracts also have important advantages over the lab. The amount of money
at stake is much greater than most laboratory settings, the markets are
naturally occurring and not subject to the distortions that come with the excess
scrutiny of the lab, and the participants self-select into these markets in a way
that is presumably analogous to other actual markets (Levitt and List 2006).
Our analysis of these markets suggests that the patterns observed provide only
mixed support for the efficient market hypothesis. Although prices jump
immediately after goals are scored, prices are higher still 10–15 minutes after
the goal. Moreover, we observe systematically negative returns for bets on
favorites, which are not predicted in an efficient market. This finding does not
appear to be an artifact of the relatively small sample of matches that we
observe, andmirrors similar patterns in other sports wageringmarkets. In favor
of market efficiency, arbitrage opportunities across inter-related markets are
few and far between. Finally, we observe the endogenous emergence of
market makers providing liquidity in these markets. Surprisingly, these
market makers generate negative profits, yet remain prevalent in the data.
In addition to the puzzles highlighted above, these markets also raise
another important question worthy of economic consideration. The structure
of this trading market is fundamentally different than the standard sports
wagering contract in which a bookie takes one side of a bet with a bettor on the
other. To compensate for the resulting risk, the bookie’s commission, known
as the vigorish, is typically 5 percent of the value of the bet. The commission
on trades at Intrade, in contrast, are less than 2 percent of the value of the bet.
Further, the Intrade contracts have the added virtue of being traded at any
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point in time, even during the event, whereas the standard bet cannot be
reversed once it is placed with a bookie. In spite of these advantages, a total of
less than $1.5 million in trades were made at Intrade in the 2002 World Cup, a
trivially small fraction of overall betting on the event. A partial answer to that
question no doubt lies in the fact that the Intrade website was relatively new at
that time. Nonetheless, more recent data from other sporting events suggests
that while this form of wagering is gaining increased acceptance among
bettors, the share of all bets done in this format is far less than that which
economists would predict given the clear advantages that these markets
provide relative to traditional forms of bookmaking.
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NOTES
1. There is, of course, an enormous literature testing various predictions of the efficient market
hypothesis. An early survey of this work is Fama (1970). For two divergent reviews, see Malkiel (2003)
and Shiller (2003).
2. Camerer’s (1998) analysis of the impact of temporary interventions in horse racing betting market,
while very different from our own study in the details, also has the feature of merging elements of
experimental studies with a real-world market.
3. Leigh et al. (2003) use data from intrade.com’s sister site, tradesports.com, to analyze the response of
financial markets to the threat of war in Iraq. Hartzmark and Solomon (2006) analyze tradesports.com
data to test efficiency in football betting markets. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) summarizes the
existing literature on prediction markets.
4. At the time of our sample, each party to a transaction pays four cents per contract to open a position and
four cents per contract to close a position. Positions that expire worthless are also charged a four cent
closure fee. The fee structure has since changed at intrade.com, and the commissions charged are now
lower. Note that these transaction costs are much smaller than the typical “vig” at traditional sports
books, where bettors must lay 11 units to win 10 on gambles that are 50–50 bets.
5. Because the contracts are for regulation time only (including injury time), in later rounds where the
game cannot end in a draw, we still observe a contract that pays off for a draw.
6. Of course, the passage of time without a goal scoring also reveals information. Since the expected
number of goals scored per minute is only 0.026, the scoring of a goal is a much greater shock to the
outcome of a game than failing to score a goal at any particular time.
7. We label the minute the goal is scored as minute number one; we do not have a minute zero in our
analysis, instead jumping directly from minute negative one to minute one.
8. This is similar to including match-window fixed effects, except that it only conditions on the pre-goal
prices. To the extent that the price impact of a goal varies by game situation, normalizing in this way
provides an easier means of interpreting the impact of a goal.
9. Note that, regardless of the process that generates goals (e.g. perhaps the opponent is more likely to
score a goal shortly after the first team scores, or one team is far more likely than the other team to score
throughout the game), efficient markets predicts that all of the post-goal b’s will be equal. A number of
previous readers have been confused by this point.
10. Note that minute zero on the graph is the minute the goal is scored, so some trades occur before the
score and others occur after.
11. In the specification in Figure 1, we have constrained the coefficient on price to have the same
magnitude (but the opposite sign) when a team scores a goal versus is scored upon. Because of the
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possibility of a draw, these two values need not be identical. In later figures, we report results separately
for goals in favor and goals against.
12. Although not shown graphically, we have also analyzed the price response to a goal being scored for a
range of subsets of the data. The impact on the price of a team to win the game is similar when the team
scores a goal to achieve a one goal lead or a two goal lead (on average the price change is 30 percentage
points). When the team scores to tie the game, the price impact is smaller (slightly below 20 percentage
points). The impact of a goal is not particularly sensitive to the price of the contract before the goal is
scored. For almost all of these sub-groups we can reject the null hypothesis that the price changes are
immediately and completely incorporated after a goal is scored.
13. In financial markets, if observable characteristics are correlated with risk factors, then expected returns
may vary, but no systematic correlation between observable factors and risk-adjusted returns should
exist.
14. In the earlier tournaments, we do not have prices from the betting markets, so we define the favorite to
be the team with the higher FIFA ranking prior to the beginning ofWorld Cup play to be the favorite. In
the 2002 World Cup, this algorithm would correctly pick the team that bettors call the favorite in 44 of
the 50 games in our sample. For consistency, we use FIFA rankings to define favorites and underdogs in
2002 in Table 4, although this is not our definition elsewhere in the paper.
15. The results concerning bettor bias towards favorites, although far from definitive given our small
sample of games, is consistent with past evidence of such biases in wagering on other sports (Levitt
2004).
16. Although not shown in the table, when contracts are broken down separately into 5, 6, 7, or 8 market
makers, the median bid-ask spread is 3 for each of those cases.
17. Further evidence that the market makers’ posted prices are not centered around the true probabilities
comes from the fact that about 6.6% of trades take place between two market makers, when one’s bid
price is above the other’s ask price.
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